INTRODUCTION
:The traditional welfare economic case against in-kind redistributions is based on the notion that the potential beneficiary could do at least as well and usually better if he were given ,the cash equivalent , 1 of the in-kind subsidy.
The preferences of the potential taxpayer are ignored. This paper builds upon the work of Tibor Scitovsky [13J and James Buchanan [lJ--who have incorporated taxpayer preferences into , 2 their analyses but, in doing so, have left out beneficiary preferences.
An analysis of the efficiency or lack thereof of in-kind redistributions 3 must take account of both taxpayer and beneficiary preferences.
In the first section of this paper I briefly summarize the positions of Scitovsky and Buchanan. In the second section, I develop a general model within which any possible combination of taxpayer and. beneficiary preferences can be analyzed. I show that the traditional case against redistribution in-kind as well as the work of Buchanan and to a lesser extent Scitovsky, are special cases based upon particular assumptions about preferences of potential taxpayers and beneficiaries and on implicit interpersonal utility comparisons.
SECTION I. BUCHANAN AND SCITOVSKY
Tibor Scitovsky argues that, while individuals are concerned about the overall distribution of income, for any given distribution, their sense of equity is satisfied in proportion to the degree to which 2 necessities are distributed equally. 4 He also suggests that although in-kind redistribution is still inefficient, it may be desirable in any case on political feasibility grounds. in the following section I show that if Scitovsky's description of taxpayer preferences is correct, in-kind redistribution may be efficient. I then consider more rigorously the analytical implications of political feasibility constraints.
James Buchanan has also challenged the argument that in-kind di ' b ' , ff" 5 U l'k h ' re str~ut~ons are~ne~c~ent.
n~e most ot er econom~sts,
Buchanan treats distribution as an allocation problem. He rejects the concept of a social welfare function on the grounds that interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made on a scientific basis.
Whatever distribution of income exists at the time, he accepts.
Buchanan then asks is there some set of ,transfers that will make some individuals better off and none worse off. If so, these tr~nsfers should be instituted. If,not, there should be no transfers.
While Scitovsky argues that non-poor individuals derive utility from an egalitarian distribution of certain goods, Buchanan argues that non-poor individuals in our society derive disutility from observing particular manifestations of poverty, such as ragged dress or run-down housing. Although there are important differences in these positions, the similarity should not be overlooked. Both argue that the poor's . consumption of particular goods generates externalities. Buchanan simply goes further~nd asserts that the non-poor neither care about the distribution of income, nor derive disutility from poverty per~.
Since the behavior of the poor generates negative externalities, the non-poor have an incentive to bribe the poor to behave differently, i.e., to change their consumption bundles. The poor also benefit from the bribe or subsidy. Because the welfare of both the poor and non-poor increases, answer these questions, the preferences of both potential taxpayers and potential beneficiaries will be examined in the next section.
II. THE ALLEGED INEFFICIENCY OF IN-KIND REDISTRIBUTIONS
In this section I consider the alleged inefficiency of in-kind distri- Finally, note that in the general case T's,bliss ppint--i.e., the
s In epen ent we are maxlmlzatlon--lS were can easily be over-emphasized. As I will show below, M is just one of an infinite number of points along the utility possibility frontier.
Choosing M from among these points requires a social welfare judgment.
B: The Beneficiary's Preferences
In order to analyze the efficiency (or lack thereof) of in-kind redistributions, preferences of benef~ciaries as well as taxpayers must be considered. The beneficiary's utility function may.be formulated as follows: 9 where Y B is his income inclusive of cash transfers and X B is the dollar cost to T of a particular kind of in-kind redistribution. (Again, though B actually derives utility from consumption of X, this is related in a unique way to T's expenditure on redistribution through X, but the former is subject to manipulation.) B's marginal rate of substitution is:
The marginal rate of subs,titution of B m~st' always,be',equal to or greater
than one because U y must always be equ~l to or greater than U x . ' Since Whether or not he wishes to transfer some of his income, only a pure cash redistribution will be efficient. This is illustrated in Figure IlIon the following page.
The bliss point of T lies outside the Edgeworth triangle. Consequently T is best off where 1 7 is tangent to the cash axis. However, suppose the community's welfare judgment is that TIS welfare should be reduced to II in order to increase that of B. Given T's preference for cash over kind the slope of II is less than one (absolute value) even The argument would not be altered if the origin were at, or to the right of, the point where 1 7 was tangent to the cash axis. Moreover, the same argument would clearly apply if T were indifferent between a cash and kind redistribution. However, if in the community's judgment T should be made worse off than II in order to further improve B's ,welfare, the range where T prefers kind to cash redistribution could become releva~t. In this case, the conclusion that an all cash redistribution is eff{cient might have to be modified.
In short, if the taxpayer is either indifferent or prefers cash to kind redistribution in the relevant range the latter is always inefficient. In these special cases, the traditional generalization from the partial equilibrium~analysis of the excess burden of an in-kind redistribution to inefficiency of in-kind transfers in general equilibrium is valid.
I', I
Suppose, on the -other hand, the taxpayer prefers in-kind to cash I :redistribution throughout the, relevant range. In ithis case a pure in-I ,kind, 0r some co~bination of cash and kind redistributiqn will be I . ' • j efficient. ,As depicted in Figure IV on the following page a combination of both is efficient. But this need not be the case~I t depends upon the original distribution of income, the community's welfare judgment;
and the preferences of T and B.
At the very least, some in-kind redistribution will be efficient because the welfare loss B suffers approaches zero as the amount of It is impossible to say, a priori, whether movements along JK are achieved by pure cash, pure in-kind, or some combination of'both.
Along JL, of course, ,redistributions consist of pure cash •.
Assume for the moment that all taxpayers prefer in-kind to cash redistribution and that some combination of both is efficient. In order to describe the best state of the world, an ethical judgment or a social welfare function specifying interpersonal utility comparisons must be supplied. To say that a combination of cash and kind redistributions is a necessary condition for achieving the "best state of the world" is not to characterize that state uniquely.
If one individual's welfare can be increased without diminishing the welfare of any other individual, the allocation of resources is inefficient. This is the case along HJ. But all points along JK are no less efficient than J. While it is true that moving from J to K involves taxation and coercion costs, this does not make R 2 or R 3 inefficient. For at R 2 or R 3 no less than at J it is impossible to make T or B better off without making the other worse off. Contrary to what
Buchanan seems to implicitly assume, the Pareto criterion of efficiency does not say that no one should be made worse off in order to make someone else better off.
The only difference,between R 2 , R 3 or any point along JK is in the distribution of welfare between T and B. Some individuals, Buchanan perhaps, will prefer J. Others will prefer some other distribution in which B is better off. The important points are these: (i) a choice is required to describe the best state of the world, and (ii) both choices involve an interpersonal utility comparison.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
Up to this point I have assumed that the utility possibility function can be fully characterized by individual preference functions and a production transformation function. This assumption overlooks the possibility that political feasibility may be an important element in the possibility constraint. Within the utility possibility frontier
there may lie what Samuelson, [11] , has called a political feasibility frontier. The former is based on technological constraints and personal tastes alone, while the latter encompasses political feasibility constraints as well. The important point for the analysis here is that,
given certain kinds of welfare or value judgments, some allocations of resources that are inefficient in terms of the utility possibility frontier will be preferred to efficient ones. Such a case is illustrated in Figure VII on the following page.
HI~{L is the utility possibility frontier. HIJK'L' is the political feasibility frontier. The initial income distribution is denoted, as before, by I. Taxpayer T is willing to pay for subsidizing B's consumption of X up to J, but beyond J additional subsidization is inefficient~-eitherbecause T does not prefer that his unwillingly paid tax.dollars be used for additional subsidization of X, or because (even though he may prefer this) his preference is so weak relative to B's welfare loss that any more subsidization of X would still be inefficient. The point K' represents the division of welfare when T is taxed enough to achieve an equal distribution of X. As illustrated in Figure VII , given a social welfare function wherein more equality is preferred to less, K' will be preferred to J on welfare grounds, even though the latter is efficient on technical grounds alone while the former is not. The point K is, of course, preferable to K'. In general although all efficient points are not preferable to all inefficient ones, there is always at least one efficient point preferable to any inefficient one. But by assumption this efficient solution is not politically feasible. In other words even if subsidization of X in excess of taxpayer's willingness to pay is inefficient in the narrow sense, it still may be preferable on welfare grounds given the political system and certain kinds of welfare or 'value judgments such as more equality is preferable to less. If every individual were reared in conditions as favorable to health as science can make them, received an equally thorough and stimulating education up to sixteen, and knew on reaching manhood, that given a reasonable measure of hard work and good for.tune, he and his family could face the risks of life without being crushed by them the most shocking of existing inequalities would be on the way to disappear. Sharp contrasts of pecuniary income might indeed remain, as long as society were too imperfectly civilized to put an end to them. But the range of life corrupted by their influence would be narrower than to-day. It would cease to be the rule for the rich to be rewarded, not only with riches, but with a preferential share of health and life, and for the penalty of the poor to be not merely poverty, lIf the price line confronting the beneficiary is not pivoted, there may be no excess burden. The beneficiary may be given x units or a voucher for the purchase of x units of the good. In this case his consumption of the good may be identical to what it would have been had he been given the cash equivalent, and there is no excess burden. Throughout the article, however, I will assume that there is an excess burden.
2Taxpayers and beneficiaries are defined in net terms. If an individual's taxes exceeds his subsidy from a redistributional program he is a taxpayer. If the opposite is true he is a beneficiary. For analytical convenience I assume no one breaks even.
3Lucien Foldes has criticized the traditional case through theoretical counter examples. [See 2, 3, 4.] He shows that under certain circumstances redistribution of all goods may be more efficient than redistribution of money alone. There are three major objections to his work. First the policy choice is redistribution of money vs. redistribution of a few--not all goods. Second, his demonstration of the superiority of in-kind redistribution in the face of ignorance of individual preference functions depends upon the assumption that policymakers are not ignorant, but actually rather well informed. In his example, they are only uncertain as to which of two'sets of preferences or contract curves prevails. But in practice policymakers know next to nothing about the slope and location of contract curves, or their utility space equivalent--the utility possibility frontier. (This appears to be the point that Mishan [9] made and Foldes misconstrued [4] .) It is not merely a question of uncertainty as to which of two, or several, states of preferences exists as Foldes treats the problem.
Under these circumstances Foldes' demonstration [4] that a concern with the distribution of income rather than the distribution of welfare is inconsistent with a definite welfare function, seems beside the point.
Samuelson [12] in making this same argument long ago labeled such a concern a fetish or shibboleth, but added, "albeit a useful one." Given our ignorance of individual preferences, the qualification is worth pondering.
Finally, Foldes implicitly accepts the traditional assumption that if the beneficiary suffers an excess burden from in-kind redistribution, then such redistribution must be inefficient. I show this is not necessarily so. 4p bl· . . u~c prov~s~on may egalitarian distribution 6] and C.M. Lindsay [8] .
5\~ile Buchanan at one point asserts that his work should be viewed as positive rather than normative, I treat it as a normative piece for two footnotes (continued) reasons: (1) it has normative content--See [7] --and, (2) even if the normative implications are not of interest to Buchanan, they are certainly relevant to welfare economics. 6In a real economy, however, there are always costs associated with trade. Trade takes time and the cost of establishing a market is always greater than zero. Moreover, even if free and costless trade were possible, in-kind redistribution might be inefficient even though it involved no excess burden from the beneficiary's point of view, because of the ineversability of production. [I owe this latter point to Charles
Metcalf. ] 7Actually, T derives utility from B'e income and consumption of X, but these are related by some parameter to my definitions of Y and X , and the latter lend themselves to easy manipulation while the~ormer~o not.
10I abstract from the problem of deriving a consistent community social welfare function from individual preferences.
llSee Pauly [10] and Lindsay [8] . 12 If the relevant range is confined to the area where U x > U y > U y B T T only in-kind redistributions are efficient no matter what beneficiary preferences are like, because the slope ot T's indifference curves will always be greater than those of B.
l3Alternatively the utility possibility frontier might be confined to the area to the right of J. But there is some analytical usefulness of examining the possibility that the initial distribution of income is along
HJ.
14 This follows from the ,definition of a Bergsonian welfare function, Wherein a'ceterusparibus increase in one individual's utility increases welfare.
15 . See Burton Weisbrod, [16] , and Vincent Taylor, [15] , who argue that the choice of whether or not to recognize taxpayer preferences is a welfare choice between beneficiaries and taxpayers.
l6For evidence that suggests taxpayers prefer some types o~in-kind redistributions see [5] .
